THE DEVALUATION OF NONWHITE COMMUNITY
IN REMEDIES FOR SUBSIDIZED HOUSING DISCRIMINATION
MICHAEL R. TEINt

INTRODUCTION
This Comment argues that judicial treatment of discrimination
in subsidized housing has not accorded proper respect to nonwhite
community as a legitimate entity.1 Unwarranted exercise ofjudicial
2
restraint, despite a broad mandate from the Supreme Court,
combined with the courts' binary understanding of the problem and
its solution have resulted in an institutional failure to recognize
discrimination in the remedial administration of federally assisted
housing programs.
A. The Problem: Discriminatoy Site Selection and Tenanting
Government programs for helping the poor to afford adequate
shelter appear to have been primarily intended to address political
and economic problems of class mobility under capitalism. 3 This
t B.A. 1988, Yale College;J.D. Candidate 1992, University of Pennsylvania.
1 The term "subsidized housing" here denotes project-based housing assistance
provided through federally funded production-oriented programs, including the
Public Housing program, see infra note 4, the Section 8 New Construction and
Substantial Rehabilitation programs, see infra note 49; the Section 236 mortgage
interest subsidy program, § 236 of the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1
(1988); the Section 202 program, § 202 of the Housing Act of 1959, 12 U.S.C.
§ 170lq (1988); the Section 221(d)(3) Below Market Interest Rate program,

§ 221(d)(3) of the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1715L(d)(3); and the Section
515 mortgage interest subsidy program administered by FmHA, § 515 of Title V of
the Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. § 1485 (1988). See generally CONGRESSIONAL

BUDGET OFFICE, CURRENT HOUSING PROBLEMS AND POSSmLE FEDERAL RESPONSES 2932 (1988).

2 See Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 306 (1976) (permitting a federal trial court
to extend relief beyond the limits of the city where the discrimination actually
occurred).
3 There is a tendency to view subsidized housing problems only in terms of class,
thereby disputing the notion that the disproportionate number of nonwhites in
assisted housing is caused by societal discrimination, and dismissing suburban
resistance to public housing as rooted in class differences, rather than racial
antagonism. See e.g., Lisa Foderado, Defiant Four: Councilmen Who are Blocking the
Yonkers HousingPlan, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1988, at B6 (reporting claims of Yonkers
City Council members that they were resisting public housing residents because they
would be low income, not because they would be minority), discussed in Martha
Mahony, Note, Law and Racial Geography: Public Housing and the Economy in New
(1463)
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was the framework within which Congress first initiated public
housing in 1937. 4 The entrenched racism in employment, 5
education, 6 and the private housing market, 7 however, created the
Orleans, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1251, 1253 (1990).
4 See United States (Wagner-Steagall) Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-412,
50 Stat. 888 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437a-j (1988)). In the New Deal
environment, public housing under the Wagner-Steagall Act was viewed as a way
station for the hard-hit members of the previously secure middle class, and aimed
primarily "to alleviate present and recurring unemployment." DAVIS MCENTIRE,
RESIDENCE AND RACE 291-92 (1960); see also LEONARD FREEDMAN, PUBLIC HOUSING:
THE POLITICS OF POVERTY 2, 100-04 (1969).
5 The movement ofjobs from the cities to the suburbs, in conjunction with the
simultaneous racial polarization of the regions, has contributed to increased
unemployment among nonwhites. See Mark Schneider & Thomas Phelan, Blacks and
Jobs: Never the Twain Shall Meet?, 26 URE. AFF. Q. 299, 299-301 (1990). Before 1945,
most factories were located in the cities; by 1981 two-thirds of all manufacturing took
place in the suburbs. For example, between 1970 and 1980, Philadelphia lost 140,000
jobs, many from the closing or relocation of local mainstay manufacturers. See
KENNETH T.JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED
STATES 266-71 (1985). Samuel J. Simmons, former Assistant Secretary for Equal
Opportunity of HUD, stated:
"As Whites have left the cities,jobs have left with them. After 1960, threefifths of all new industrial plants constructed in this country were outisde
[sic] of central cities. In some cases as much as 85% of all new industrial
plants located outside central cities were inaccessible to Blacks and other
minorities who swelled ghetto populations."
Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 503 F.2d 930, 938 (7th Cir. 1974) (citation
omitted) (quoting Assistant Secretary Simmons).
6 SeeJONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS
83-99 (1991). Thirty-eight years of public school desegregation orders have had little
effect on the vast discrepancies between the public education of nonwhite and white
students. Kozol's study cites as an example District 10 in New York City. Spacious
P.S. 24, serving the district's predominantly white neighborhood of Riverdale, boasts
an eighth-grade reading level for its average sixth grader. P.S. 79, with a 99%
nonwhite student body, holds classes in a gymnasium; P.S. 261, which is 90% AfricanAmerican and Hispanic, is housed in a windowless converted rollerskating rink; and
in P.S. 94, in the North Bronx section of District 10, 1300 students study in a building
designed for 700 and sit in classrooms where enough of the ceiling has collapsed that
rain leaks in. See id. Differences among the 32 school districts in New York City are
even more marked: affluent districts are funded at a rate 14 times higher than their
poorer counterparts. See id. at 98. A recent Community Service Society report points
out that "it is inescapable that these inequities are being perpetrated on [school]
districts which are virtually all black and Hispanic" and are the result of, at the very
least, "'systemic bias.'" See id. at 99 (quoting COMMUNITY SERV. SOC'Y OF N.Y.,
PROMOTING POVERTY: THE SHIFT OF RESOURCES AWAY FROM LOW-INCOME NEW YORK
CITY SCHOOL DISTRICTS (1987)).
7 Despite legal prohibitions under the Fair Housing Act against discrimination in
the sale or rental of housing, race-based obstacles still confront nonwhites who search
for private housing. Racial steering, redlining, and acts of racial intimidation
continue to frustrate minority housing consumers. See e.g., Alan Finder, Racism and
Arson: A New Chapterin an Old Story, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1990, at 40 (reporting that
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economic frictions that enabled a correlation between class and
race. The complexion of subsidized housing has reflected these
frictions: presently, the majority of persons receiving rental
8
assistance are nonwhite.
Residential segregation in both the federally assisted and private
markets is pervasive. 9 The postwar era has witnessed a polarization
in housing patterns, with the suburbs predominantly white and the
central cities nonwhite. 10 Under Plessy v. Ferguson11 public housing was legally segregated by project and nonwhite projects were
located in nonwhite urban areas. 12 Even after Brown v. Board of
racially motivated arson destroyed a house purchased two weeks earlier by the first
African-American family on an all-white block in Brooklyn). See generally JOHN F.
KAIN & JOHN M. QUIGLEY, HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION: A
MIcROEcONoMIc ANALYSIS 56-91 (1975) (discussing economic effects of discrimin-

atory practices in the private housing market). Nonwhites pay more for equivalent
housing than do whites and are more likely to be denied mortgage loans than whites
with similar financial profiles. See e.g., Mary R.Jackman & Robert W.Jackman, Racial
Inequalities in Home Ownership, in RACE, ETHNICIY, AND MINORITY HOUSING IN THE
UNITED STATES 39,48 (Jamshid A. Momeni ed., 1986) (noting that racial discrimina-

tion accounts for price differentials between comparable homes owned by AfricanAmericans and whites); see also BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYSTEM,
REDLINING: RESEARCH AND FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE 8-10 (1982) (summarizing
several studies indicating that nonwhite applicants are more likely to be denied
mortgage loans that their similarly situated white counterparts).
8 In 1979, HUD determined that 47.1% of low-income housing project residents
were African-American, 38.4% were white, 12.2% were Hispanic, 1.5% were Native
American, 0.5% were Asian-American, and 0.5% were "other minorities." See U.S.
DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEV., 1979 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 206 (1979) (table 64).

In 1989, HUD statistics indicated that of the 2.4 million residents of housing
authority-owned units, 39.8% were African-American, and 12.4% were Hispanic. Of
the 1.4 million receiving demand subsidies, 34.0% were African-American and 10.6%
were Hispanic. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE & U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. AND URBAN
DEV., CURRENT HOUSING REPORTS: AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED
STATES IN 1989, at 58 (1990).
9 To attain complete integration of the large metropolitan regions, in 1980, an

average of 79% of African-Americans, 48% of Hispanics, and 43% of Asian-Americans
would have needed to move from their 1980 residences. See George C. Galster,
FederalFairHousingPolicy: The Great Misapprehension, in BUILDING FOUNDATIONS:
HOUSING AND FEDERAL POLICY 137 (Denise DiPasquale & Langley C. Keyes eds.,
1990) [hereinafter BUILDING FOUNDATIONS].
10
See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, HOUSING 1-6 (1961) (describing the isolation
of nonwhites in the central cities and whites in surrounding suburbs as a "white
noose"). See generallyJAMES A. KUSHNER, APARTHEID IN AMERICA: AN HISTORICAL
AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF CONTEMPORARY RACIAL SEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES
20-30 (1980) (discussing changes in housing patterns since World War II).

1 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
See KUSHNER, supranote 10, at 31-32; ROBERT C. WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETTO

12

73, 143-44, 159 (1948). Alexander Polikoff notes:
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Education,1 3 local public housing authorities continued to segregate projects based on race and to build public housing primarily in
nonwhite neighborhoods unless the project was aimed at housing
whites.1 4 The result is that most subsidized housing is located in
urban centers, with the small amount of suburban stock confined
15
mostly to nonwhite tracts.
B. The Conflicting Goals of the FairHousing Act 16
The stated purpose of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) is "to

provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States."' 7 No Supreme Court opinion precisely
defines "fair housing," although the Court has emphasized that
racial integration is both important and desirable.18 There are two
views of the goals of the FHA: one, it aims only to eliminate
discrimination; 19 and two, it is designed to eliminate discriminaBecause the black population of the central cities had grown enormously
during the war years and had continued to increase in the 50s and early 60s,
in the larger cities the new public housing would serve a heavily black
clientele. In the mores of the times it was therefore put in black neighborhoods. Also in the mores of the times, many of the newer projects were
high-rises; costs were to be kept low by putting more and more apartments
into taller and taller buildings.
Alexander Polikoff, Gautreauxand InstitutionalLitigation, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 451,
452(1988). The legality of segregating housing projects by race was upheld in Favors
v. Randall, 40 F. Supp. 743, 747-48 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
13 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
14 See infra notes 34-78 and accompanying text.
15 See, e.g., Robert Gray & Steven Tursky, Location and Racial/Ethnic Occupancy
Patternsfor HUD-Subsidized Family Housing in Ten Metropolitan Areas, in HOUSING
DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POLICY 235, 249-51 (John M. Goering ed., 1986)
[hereinafter HOUSING DESEGREGATION] (concluding that within ten large central cities
most projects were located in a relatively small number of nonwhite census tracts and
85% or more of the occupants of projects located in nonwhite areas were nonwhite).
16 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988) (Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968).
17 Id. § 3601.
18 See, e.g., Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 112-15 (1979)
(upholding residents' constitutional standing to protest the intentional segregation
of their community); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210
(1972) (noting the "important benefits from interracial associations"); see also
Alexander Polikoff, SustainableIntegration or Inevitable Resegregation?: The Troubling
Questions, in HOUsING DESEGREGATION, supra note 15, at 43, 47.
19 The FHA covers discrimination in the rental and sale of housing between
private individuals, as well as transactions in which the state is directly involved (i.e.
any form of subsidized housing). Discrimination in the private sphere is often
confused with discrimination in the administration of the public sphere because the
results are similar: segregation and lower quality facilities for minorities. The
discriminatory practices are also similar in form (either a private actor or a state actor
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tion as a means towards promoting integration. 20 The "antidiscrimination" goal is explicit in the Act;21 the "integration" goal
has been read into it, largely through reference to the legislative
history.22 The cornerstone of the integration argument is the
remark by Senator Mondale, the Act's sponsor, that its purpose is
to replace the ghettos "by truly integrated and balanced living
23
patterns."
It is doubtful that this is a fair reading of the Act. Resurrecting
the integration goal from the legislative history, with no explicit
mention of this goal in the statute's text, and placing it on a par
with the textual anti-discrimination goal, is a questionable hermeneutic enterprise. Moreover, the Supreme Court has indicated that
the legislative history is unhelpful in interpreting the FHA,24 which
25
was passed in an abbreviated session with no committee reports.
discriminates against a prospective minority buyer or tenant). By placing subsidized
housing in nonwhite tracts, the State reinforces and exacerbates patterns of private
discrimination. This Comment addresses the remedying of housing discrimination
only2 to the extent that it occurs in federally assisted housing.
0 See Polikoff, supra note 18, at 48. These goals are not entirely independent:
the correlation between race and poverty is borne out of discrimination. Since this
discrimination in turn affects where people live, housing assistance programs can
affect both how and where people live. This broad view of fair housing was
incorporated into federal policy with the Housing Act of 1949, the stated aim of
which is "a decent home and a suitableliving environment for every American family."
Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, § 2, 63 Stat. 413, 413 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988)) (emphasis added).
21

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a), (b), (f)(1)-(3), 3605(a), 3606 (1988).

Senator Brooke, a cosponsor of the FHA, expounded on the Act: "Can we state
the proposition any more dearly? America's future ... does not require imposed
residential and social integration.... It does not require that government interfere
with legitimate personal preferences of individuals; it does require that government
protect the freedom of individuals to choose where they wish to live." 114 CONG.
REC. 2525 (1968). For a discussion of "race-conscious housing counseling" in light
of the Act's legislative history and subsequent commentary, see Polikoff, supra note
18, at 47-50. The legislative history to the Housing and Community Development Act
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.), indicates Congress's goal of developing urban communities through, among
other things, "increased neighborhood diversity." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1279, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4273, 4449.
23 114 CONG. REc. 3422 (1968). But Senator Mondale also stated:
Obviously, [the Fair Housing Act] is to be read in context with the entire
bill, the objective being to eliminate discrimination in the sale or rental of
housing .... Without doubt, it means to provide for what is provided in
the bill. It means the elimination of discrimination in the sale or rental of
housing. That is all it could possibly mean.
Id. at 4975.
24 See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972).
2 See Michael F. Potter, RacialDiversity in ResidentialCommunities: SocietalHousing
22
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C. CurrentRemedial Doctrine as StructurallyDiscriminatory

Subsidized housing is a theater of the ideal world insofar as
Congress, the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), and local public housing authorities (PHAs) have the unique
opportunity to create and maintain, largely immune from the
vicissitudes of a racist private market, communities that reflect the
legal interpretation of non-discrimination. 26 Thus, government
determinations of where to place and permit subsidized housing
should be subjected to excruciating examination under the theory
that site selection is the state's demonstration of the way the private
market should function were it entirely consistent with the FHA and
27
equal protection.
Patternsand a Proposalfora "RacialInclusionaty Ordinance," 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1151,
1224 (1990); Rodney A. Smolla, IntegrationMaintenance: The Unconstitutionalityof
Benign Programsthat DiscourageBlack Entry to Prevent White Flight,1981 DUKE L.J. 891,
910-11.
26 See John Yinger, On the Possibility of Achieving Racial Integration Through
Subsidized Housing, in HOUSING DESEGREGATION, supra note 15, at 290, 302 (finding
that "[t]he starting point for any site selection procedure is the principle that, all else
equal, subsidized housing should be placed in neighborhoods where low-income
households would be most likely to live without restrictive zoning or racial
discrimination"). Of course, the administration of subsidized housing reflects current
public policy, but that policy has leeway only to the extent that it remains within the
bounds of the legal doctrine. For example, levels of funding and physical design are
primarily policy determinations, but the administration of the funding must not
violate constitutional prohibitions against discrimination.
The legal meaning of "discrimination" is still evolving. It was not until 1954,
nearly a century after the Equal Protection Clause was added to the Constitution, that
the Court recognized that segregation based on race with "equal" accommodations
violated the Fourteenth Amendment. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 397 U.S. 483
(1954). Statutory discrimination against women was not identified as a constitutional
violation until 1971. CompareReed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (invalidating an Idaho
law mandating that "[o]f several persons ... equally entitled to administer [a
decedent's estate], males must be preferred to females") with Bradwell v. Illinois, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872) (upholding state bar association's denial of admission to
women). Gender-based discrimination in places of public accommodation remains
legal under Titles II and III of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78
Stat. 245, 245-46 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000b-3, 2000b to 2000b-3
(1988)). See DeCrow v. Hotel Syracuse Corp., 288 F. Supp. 530, 531-32 (N.D.N.Y.
1968) (holding that Title II does not prohibit private hotel from maintaining a policy
of refusing to serve "anunescorted woman" at a restaurant bar). Only recently has
the law recognized that even subtle forms of discriminatory behavior are equally
objectionable and injurious. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 801 (1973) (stating that "Title VII [Equal Employment Opportunities] tolerates
no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise"). Congress's current view of what
constitutes discriminatory behavior is codified in Chapter 21 (Civil Rights) of Title 42
(Public Health and Welfare) of the United States Code.
27 The branch of equal protection doctrine embraced by this Comment's analysis
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Martin Luther King, Jr., W.E.B. DuBois, and many other civil
rights leaders have supported a program of integration based on the
"contact hypothesis" view that integration leads to greater authentic
understanding among the races and a corresponding waning of
antagonism based on racial differences. 28 For a long time, civil
rights advocates and the courts interpreted this approach to racial
harmony to mean that integration was an end in itself, thus
assuming that absent discrimination, the social, political, and
29
economic orders would be entirely integrated.
Integrating subsidized housing is a valid and necessary means
under the FHA to eradicate past discrimination in the public and
private housing markets, and this approach to civil rights reform has
achieved deeply significant progress towards racial equality. Where,
however, the goal of integration is pursued to deny legitimacy to
is the prohibition against stigma. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment invalidates state action
employing a race-based classification if the scheme implicates a hierarchical view of
race in which one or more races are subordinated. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880) (striking down state statute rendering only white males
eligible forjury service based on Fourteenth Amendment right to be "exempt[] from
legal discrimination implying inferiority in civil society"); Brown v. Board of Educ.,
397 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954) (declaring that "[s]eparate educational facilities are
inherently unequal"); Lovingv. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,11-12 (1967) (finding unconstitutional a state statute prohibiting interracial marriage because it was based on notions
of white supremacy and the "integrity of the white race"); Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357-58 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[R]acial classifications that stigmatizebecause they are drawn on the presumption that one race is inferior to another or
because they put the weight of government behind racial hatred and separatism-are
invalid without more." (citations omitted)); see also Roberts v. United StatesJaycees,
468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984) (striking down on stigma grounds, among others, the
exclusion
of women from a prominent community civic organization).
28
See Potter, supra note 25, at 1182; see also BLACK PROTEST THOUGHT IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 67-72, 291-306 (August Meier et al. eds., 1965) (excerpting
writings of King and DuBois); DANIEL W. WYNN, THE BLACK PROTEST MOVEMENT
209-12 (1974) (discussing the integrationist agenda).
29 See, e.g., Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441-42 (1968) (striking down
a "freedom of choice" school desegregation plan as inadequately complying with
Brown II, see Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955), and ordering the school
board affirmatively to integrate the district); United States v.Jefferson County Bd. of
Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 894-96 (5th Cir. 1966) (holding that the Constitution compels
formerly dejure segregated public school systems based on dual attendance zones to
shift to unitary non-racial systems). See generally Ankur J. God, Maintaining
IntegrationAgainst Minority Interests: An Anti-Subjugation TheotyforEquality In Housing,
22 URB. LAW. 369,385-402 (1990) (discussingintegration as the traditional civil rights
movement's driving vision); Ankur J. Goel et al., Comment, Black Neighborhoods
Becoming Black Cities: Group Empowermen4 Local Control and the Implications of Being
Darker Than Brown, 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 415, 427-31 (1988) (same).
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nonwhite community, the anti-discrimination goal of the FHA and
equal protection are violated. The project of exploring alternatives
to an obsessive remedial focus on integration should not invoke a
terrain defined by conservative politics, but instead should take the
form of a more sensitive approach to addressing nonwhite concerns.3 0 If the subsidized housing stage is to be shared by both
"anti-discrimination" and "integration," the second goal must yield
the spotlight to the first should they conflict.
This Comment argues that judicial remedies that force integration in subsidized housing fail to account for the right of nonwhite
tenants to choose not to integrate.3 1 Forced integration in subsidized housing presumes that in a society free from discrimination
nonwhites will choose to live dispersed among whites. 32 This
belief itself is discriminatory because it denies legitimacy to
nonwhite community, implying that the only proper residential
30 See generally Derrick A. Bell,Jr., Serving Two Masters: IntegrationIdeals and Client
Interests in School DesegregationLitigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 471 (1976) (noting that in
the school desegregation context "[tihere is increasing opposition to desegregation
at both local and national levels (not all of which can now be simply condemned as
'racist')"). Eradicating discrimination in assisted housing does not necessarily entail
desegregation, but rather "nonsegregation." See infra notes 133-185 and accompanying text.
31 See generally Henry W. McGee,Jr., Afro-American Resistance to Gentrificationand
the Demise of IntegrationistIdeology in the United States, 23 URB. LAW. 25, 28-29, 39-41
(1991) (arguing that contrary to the widespread support of integration when that
agenda "was at its zenith in the heady days of the Civil Rights movement," today
.many blacks no longer embrace an arguably dated integrationist ideology").
W.E.B. DuBois, while a proponent of integration, also counseled:
The experience in the United States has been that usually when there is
racial segregation, there is also racial discrimination. But the two things do
not necessarily go together, and there should never be an opposition to
segregation pure and simple unless that segregation does involve discrimination.... [T]here [is] no objection to colored people living beside colored
people if the surroundings and treatment involve no discrimination, if the
streets are well lighted, if there is water, sewerage and police protection, and
if anybody of any color who wishes, can live in that neighborhood.... But
never in the world should our fight be against association with ourselves
because by that very token we give up the whole argument that we are
worth associating with.
W.E.B. DuBois, Postscript,THE CRisis, Jan. 1934, at 20.
32 Housing subsidies are unlike other income-related subsidies in that they have
been administered to achieve a goal independent of their primary purpose. For
example, Medicare and Medicaid enable the purchasing of better health care, food
stamps enable the purchasing of more or better food, and welfare is a direct income
subsidy. But while housing assistance enables the tenant to "purchase" better
housing, it is also used as a vehicle to accomplish the separate goal of integration.
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pattern is one where a majority white community prevails over a
submerged nonwhite minority.33
The judicially enforced belief that integration, no matter how
small the scale on which it is implemented, will eradicate discrimination carries with it racist assumptions about assimilating nonwhites
by diluting nonwhite identity through dispersal. This belief assumes
that absent pervasive discrimination nonwhites would necessarily
choose to live amidst the white majority rather than live among
others with whom they share common heritage, values, beliefs, and
culture, as many ethnic whites do (e.g., Italians, Jews).
Since Title VIII bans both overt and subtle racism, any remedial
measure that contains traces of even subtle racism is invalid. This
Comment tracks and reveals these subtle-yet no less invidious and
harmful-racist assumptions as they are played out in the judicial
treatment of involuntary and voluntary remedies to past discrimination in the administration of federally assisted housing programs.
Section I of this Comment discusses involuntary, or courtimposed, desegregation orders for municipalities found to have
maintained a segregated system of subsidized housing by locating
housing projects primarily in nonwhite residential areas, or by
segregating tenants. This is the most basic manifestation of the
33 Cf Goel, supra note 29, at 391-92. Goel argues that the guiding principle
behind a non-discriminatory integration-promoting administration of the Fair
Housing Act should be "anti-subjugation." "Anti-subjugation," according to Goel,
"holds that 'it is inappropriate for certain groups in society to have subordinated
status because of their lack of power in society as a whole.'" Id. at 395 (quoting Ruth
Colker, Anti-SubordinationAbove All: Sex Race, andEqualProtection,61 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1003, 1007 (1986)).
Goel's analysis of integration maintenance programs illustrates the necessity of
recognizing the legitimacy of minority choice:
Some integration maintenance programs stigmatize those who civil rights
legislation was intended to benefit. In the focus on achieving integration,
some also cast aside the more important goal of improving housing
conditions for members of previously oppressed groups. Finally, some
integration maintenance programs show a disregard for the independent
pluralistic and political values minority groups can gain by choosing not to
integrate.
Id. at 415.
Under this "anti-subjugation" analysis, "demand alteration" measures seeking to
encourage white entry into nonwhite communities or steering nonwhites away from
white neighborhoods are unacceptable, as are ceiling quotas. But two-way "benign
steering" measures, employing counseling and financial incentives, as well as "equity
insurance" plans to compensate private homeowners for declines in their property
values resulting from nonwhite entrance into white neighborhoods, would be
permitted.
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remedial structure that privileges integration over anti-discrimination. Under traditional civil rights analysis wide-scale forced
integration would be the cure for these broad-based discriminatory
policies. Even accepting this premise, the courts have been halting
and considerably restrained in ordering integration. Consequently,
the tentative spurts of subsidized housing integration have resulted
in tokenism and devaluation of nonwhite community.
Section II discusses the courts' pursuit of integration at the
expense of anti-discrimination, specifically focusing on their
treatment of nonwhite ceiling quotas within projects. This line of
cases has carved out a rule that permits such measures if the white
community's interest in preventing "white flight" from the areas
surrounding the projects is defined broadly. This rule sacrifices the
anti-discrimination goal and is highly stigmatizing. Ceiling quotas
on nonwhite tenants marginalize nonwhites by implying that the
nonwhite population in a "valid community" is always restricted to
a minority proportion. This Section argues that even if "white
flight" were a sociologically cognizable reaction to nonwhite
population dominance, the courts have no business lending
legitimacy to the racist fears of whites by constructing myopic legal
rules around them.
Section III considers the "integration versus anti-discrimination"
calculus in the analysis of site selection for new projects. Regulations promulgated by HUD that prohibit building in areas of
"minority concentration" privilege integration to the detriment of
critical housing needs within existing nonwhite communities.
Although there is a strong presumption in light of history that
placing projects in nonwhite areas is motivated by an effort to
relegate poor nonwhites (and nonwhites generally) to the geographic and social margins, these regulations, consistent with prior.
jurisprudence, effectively dismiss the desire to cultivate nonwhite
community as irrelevant. This practice probably reflects the
remedial process's inability to accord value to minority voices rather
than an active negation of nonwhite choice. Fortunately, the courts
have shown a tendency to look beyond traditional remedial analysis:
recognizing that nonwhites may desire better housing more than
integrated housing, they have generally favored the building of new
subsidized housing over strict adherence to the regulations.
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I. INVOLUNTARY REMEDIES: JUDICIAL RESTRAINT IN
SITE INTEGRATION
A. The Gautreaux Case
In 1966, a group of nonwhite public housing tenants filed suit
against the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) and HUD alleging
that, in violation of the Fifth Amendment and Title VI, nearly all of
the family public housing sites selected by CHA between 1950 and
1965 were located "within the areas known as the Negro Ghetto" in
order to "avoid the placement of Negro families in white neighborhoods." 4 The uncontradicted evidence showed that the Chicago
system was entirely segregated, "with four overwhelmingly white
projects located in white neighborhoods and with 99 1/2% of the
remaining family units located in Negro neighborhoods and 99% of
those units occupied by Negro tenants." 5 The district court
found that almost 100% of potential project sites in white neighborhoods were vetoed compared with 10% of potential sites in
36
nonwhite neighborhoods.
Even though the violation appeared to be confined to the city
limits of Chicago, the Supreme Court upheld a comprehensive
interdistrict remedy that extended throughout metropolitan Chicago
and into the surrounding suburbs. Justice Stewart distinguished the
then-recent school desegregation case, Milliken v. Bradley,37 which
held that there could not be an interdistrict remedy absent an
interdistrict violation. He urged flexibility in constructing equitable
relief since HUD had violated the Constitution, a8 the CHA and

4 Gautreauxv. Chicago Hous. Auth., 265 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Gautreaux
v. Romney, 332 F. Supp. 366 (N.D. Ill. 1971), rev'd, 457 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1972).
Elements of this litigation were still pending as recently as 1990. See, e.g.,
Gautreaux v. Kemp, 132 F.R.D. 193 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (denying petitions to enjoin
construction of 101 townhouses to be built on 11 scattered sites, based on
unsubstantiated assertion that the neighborhood was already 99% black). The
Gautreaux litigation was purportedly terminated in 1981 when CHA, HUD, and the
plaintiff class entered into a consent decree. See Gautreaux v. Pierce, 690 F.2d 616,
621-24 (7th Cir. 1982).
-" Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 288 (1976). In July 1968 the CHA was
comprised of 54 family housing projects with 30,848 units. See id. at 288 n.5.
56
See Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 912 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
Judge Austin held that statistics by themselves were sufficient to prove intent,
reasoning that "[n]o criterion, other than race, [could] plausibly explain" the pattern
of site selection. Id.

37 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
38 See Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 297.
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HUD had powers extending beyond Chicago city limits, 9 and the
operation of this system had "significant segregative effects in the
suburbs." 40 Using HUD's own guidelines, 41 Justice Stewart concluded that "[t]he relevant geographic area for purposes of the
respondents' housing options is the Chicago housing market, not
the Chicago city limits." 42
Chicago's politicians proved their unyielding stamina in resisting
the implementation of the Gautreaux metropolitan order against
CHA. Between 1969, when the district court had sought only to
implement a remedy within Chicago city limits, and 1974 no new
public housing was built in Chicago. The Chicago City Council
vetoed every CHA proposal for a new site. 43 Judge Austin enjoined their veto power in 1972, but the injunction did not take
effect until the Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1974. 44 Public
opposition provided the next set of barriers. Between 1974 and
1979 only 117 new units were constructed.4 5 In 1979 Mayor Jane
Byrne pledged her support to the scattered-site program on the
condition that the agreed-upon ratio of units built in white areas to
units built in nonwhite areas be reduced from three-to-one to oneto-one. 46 New construction then proceeded so slowly that the
CHA was placed in receivership in May 1987. 47
The portion of the order directed at HUD was implemented in
a much more effective manner through development of the
"Gautreaux Demonstration." 48 This Section 8 program 49 used a

39 See id. at 298-300.
40 Id. at 294.
41 Id. at 299 (quoting DEPARTMENT OF Hous. & URBAN DEv., FHA TECHNIQUES

OF HOUSING MARKET ANALYSIS 12 (1970), which states that the housing market area
"usually extends beyond the city limits" and in larger markets "may extend into
several adjoining counties").
42 Id. at 299.

43 See
44 See
480 F.2d
41 See

Polikoff, supra note 12, at 459.
Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 342 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. 111. 1972), aff'd,
210 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1144 (1974).
Polikoff, supra note 12, at 459-60.

46 See id. at 460.
47

See Adam M. Shayne, AcceleratingIntegration:EffectiveRemedies in PublicHousing
DiscriminationSuits, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 375, 387 (1990).
48 See id. at 385.

49 "Section 8" refers to the provision of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f
(1988)), that created three new housing assistance programs for low-income families:
Existing Housing, New Construction, and Substantial Rehabilitation. Section 8
"Existing Housing" is a demand-subsidy program that provides participating families
with "certificates" or "vouchers" with which they can pay rent to private landlords.

1992]

SUBSIDIZED HOUSING DISCRIMINATION

1475

housing assistance payment approach to provide two to three
hundred units of subsidized housing a year to the Gautreaux
plaintiffs; 50 it resulted in aid to 3500 families (over 10,000 tenants)
51
and the relocation of many of them to the suburbs.
B. Gautreaux's Legacy
The Supreme Court's sweeping remedy in Gautreauxseemed to
open the doors for voluntary implementation of programs like the
Gautreaux Demonstration on a nationwide scale. HUD and local
PHAs declined the invitation. At the very least, the decision gave
the green light to private plaintiffs and the U.S. Attorney to bring
suits against local PHAs to remedy segregative site selection through
involuntary metropolitan desegregation orders. In the few cases
litigating claims of discriminatory site selection, the courts have
designed remedies much less extensive than permitted by the
Supreme Court in Gautreaux. The orders, which are discussed in
this Section, are examples of excessive judicial restraint.
When implemented on a large scale, as with the Gautreaux
Demonstration, "scattered site" housing probably achieves some
discrimination reduction by means of integration. 52 The very
limited scope of the remedies ordered, however, even in cases
where the intensity of the violation ranks with that in Gautreaux,
creates a perfunctory judicial gesture towards integration that
achieves little more than tokenism. 53 The practical result is that
The units must meet federal minimum quality standards, see infra note 152, and rent
for less than a market-indexed ceiling. Under Section 8 "New Construction," HUD
guarantees private developers of new housing projects that it will subsidize rental
payments provided that some or all of the units are made available to low-income
households. "Substantial Rehabilitation" operates similarly with respect to owners
who agree to renovate existing structures. See generally GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, SECTION 8 SUBSIDIZED HOUSING-SOME OBSERVATIONS ON ITS HIGH RENTS,
COSTS AND INEQUITIES 1-7 (1980).
50 See Shayne, supra note 47, at 385.
51 See id.

152 About half of the 3500 families relocated under the Gautreaux Demonstration
moved to the suburbs of Chicago. According to a HUD study, 84% felt that the
quality of their lives had improved. See DIVISION OF PoIUCY STUDIES, DEP'T OF Hous.
& URB. DEV., THE GAUTREAUX HOUSING DEMONSTRATION: AN EVALUATION OF ITS
IMPACT ON PARTICIPATING HOUSEHOLDS Ii (1979), cited in Polikoff, supra note 12, at

474.
53 The impact on families can be quite severe. Two commentators noted the costs
of limited measures of integration:
The social isolation of being greatly outnumbered as a minority resident in
a predominantly white suburb could only aggravate the hurt of any racially
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a limited number of participants gain access to the higher-quality
municipal services of the suburbs, but the bulk of assisted families
remains concentrated in segregated areas and facilities with the
judicial role exhausted. Thus, the violation remains substantially
without redress, despite the court's having waved its remedial magic
wand.
54

1. United States v. Yonkers Board of Education

The Yonkers case provides the most striking recent example of
a blatant and extensive violation of the Fair Housing Act and the
Fourteenth Amendment redressed with a small-scale remedy.
Yonkers, New York, is substantially segregated. The bulk of the
nonwhite population is confined to the southwest portion of the
city. Ninety-seven percent of Yonkers's subsidized housing is
located in southwest Yonkers. 55 None of the City's twenty-seven
subsidized housing projects for families are located in the overwhelmingly white neighborhoods in the east and northwest. 56 The
district court found that the city had engaged in over thirty years of
intentional discrimination, 5 7 placing the predominantly nonwhite
motivated harassment experienced there and would certainly lessen the willingness of minority groups to move to integrate. The personal and social
costs of [limited] integration may be too high for minorities to bear
willingly.
Wilhelmina A. Leigh &James D. McGhee, A Minority Perspectiveon ResidentialRacial
Integation, in HOUsING DESEGREGATION, supra note 15, at 31, 37.
624 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988).
-' See id. at 1348.
56 See id. at 1364. The only measure in the Yonkers Housing Assistance Plan "that
offered any significant chance of dispersing at least some subsidized housing for
families into the overwhelmingly white neighborhoods of East and Northwest
Yonkers" was a 1974-75 proposal for 100 Section 8 Existing certificates, see infranote
152 (defining the "Section 8 Existing" program), split 50-50 between families and
senior citizens. See Yonkers, 624 F. Supp. at 1343.
57 The court found that "the desire to preserve existing patterns of segregation
has been a significant factor in the sustained community opposition to subsidized
housing in... overwhelmingly white areas of the City." Yonkers, 624 F. Supp. at
1371. The court was not greatly concerned with uncovering discriminatory purpose;
to this end Judge Sand did not require proof that decisions on site selection were
based wholly on race: "[S]uch findings could rarely, if ever, be made." Id; see also
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266
(1977) (stating that "[d]etermining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a
motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct
evidence of intent as may be available").Judge Sand noted that, from the perspective
of theory, the case presented an unusually difficult challenge for pegging intent
because the violation occurred over a 30-year span by a changing group of city
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family projects in southwest Yonkers and locating the generally
58
white housing projects for the elderly in white areas.
Given the scale of the violation, the remedial order was
remarkably restrained. The consent decree approved by the district
court provided for a core of 200 low- and very-low-income
townhouse-style units to be built immediately in the white areas of
Yonkers and for a less definite agreement to make "good faith
efforts" to foster the private development of another 600 units of
"affordable" housing over the next three years. 59 The Second
Circuit, in denying Yonkers's challenge to the remedy, recognized
that "[tlhe number of units, 200, was hardly excessive in light of the
City's agreement with HUD [(the consent decree describing the
extent of the violation)] and the existing concentration of 6,566
units of housing, or 96.6% of all of its subsidized housing, in
Southwest." 60 If the defect of Yonkers's system lies in its segregation, locating a mere ten percent of its subsidized housing in white
61
areas hardly embarks down the road to meaningful integration.
62
2. United States v. City of Parma

The district court in City of Parmafound that Parma, the largest
suburb of Cleveland, had maintained a "long-standing policy and
practice of excluding black persons from residing in Parma in any
substantial numbers." 63 Parma violated the Fair Housing Act by
officials. See Yonkers, 624 F. Supp. at 1369. He indicated, however, that "when the
segregative effect of an action is extreme, or when there is a series of actions having
a consistently segregative effect, the inference is stronger that the effect of the actions
is intended." Id.
58 Placement of elderly housing projects, "which, unlike subsidized housing for
families, tended to be heavily white," provoked far less opposition in the white areas
of Yonkers. See Yonkers, 624 F. Supp. at 1371.
59 City of Yonkers v. United States, 487 U.S. 1251, 1252 (1988) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in relevant part).
60 United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1237 (2d Cir. 1987)
(emphasis added), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988).
1 A limited remedy was also imposed by the court in Resident Advisory Board v.
Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977). The court was presented with evidence that
discrimination by the Philadelphia PHA and HUD that segregated the Whitman
Urban Renewal Area ran throughout the interrelated projects of the Philadelphia
system. The lower court ordered systemwide desegregation, but the Third Circuit
confined the remedy to the proposed Whitman project. See id. at 152.
62 494 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. Ohio), remedial order, 504 F. Supp. 913 (N.D. Ohio
1980), affd in par rev'd in part, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981).
63 City of Parma, 504 F. Supp. at 915. Parma had a population of 100,216 of
whom 50 residents were African-American. See City of Parma,661 F.2d at 566. The
trial court found that "[t]he proposition that the Cleveland metropolitan area and
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its "adamant and longstanding opposition to any form of public or
low-income housing," specifically the denial of a building permit for
a low-income housing development, the passage of a thirty-five-foot
residential height restriction ordinance, and the passage 64of an
ordinance requiring voter approval for low-income housing.
Among other remedies,6" the court required Parma to build
133 units of low-income housing per year, and it appointed a special
master to supervise the program. 66 Given HUD's determination
that Parma's low-income housing need was 2669 units and that the
city currently had none, the order was a measured effort at relief in
light of the court's duty "to eliminate, to the extent possible, the
where
discriminatory effects of Parma's [past] actions," 67 especially
68
Congress expressly authorized such sweeping relief.
The district court explicity recognized the likelihood of political
impediments to implementing the remedy, and for this reason set
a specific number of units and appointed a special master to

Parma became racially segregated solely as a result of associational preferences and
economics, and not because of racial discrimination, is refuted overwhelmingly by the
evidence in this case." City of Parma,494 F. Supp. at 1057.
64 See City of Parma, 504 F. Supp. at 915. The court found all these actions
motivated by "a racially discriminatory and exclusionary intent and had foreseeable
segregative effects." Id.
65 The district court's willingness to fashion an extensive and highly specific

remedy highlighted the severity of the violation. One aspect of the remedial order
required Parma to advertise itself as an "open community" where "all persons are
welcome" and to proclaim that "discriminatory practices which have characterized
Parma in the past no longer reflect the attitude of the City and its citizens." Id.
Another required all Parma city officials and employees to undergo a mandatory "fair
housing educational program." Id. at 918.
66 See id. at 923.
67 Id. at 916.

68 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(1) (1988) (establishing that in a suit by a private
person injunctive relief includes ordering affirmative action); id. § 3614(d)(1)(A)
(establishing that in a suit by the Attorney General, "the court... may award such
preventative relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order,
or other order against the person responsible for a violation of this subchapter"); see
also Park View Heights Corp. v. City of BlackJack, 605 F.2d 1033, 1040 (8th Cir.
1979) (noting that a remedial provision of FHA requires fashioning relief to the
extent that it will eliminate the discriminatory effects of the violative action). The
Parma district court reasoned that
the magnitude of Parma's liability has necessitated a remedy which
addresses the numerous illegal actions by the Defendant City. The
magnitude of the wrong has dictated the magnitude of the remedy, which
is, necessarily, broader than remedies in prior housing cases which involved
[only] a single discriminatory ordinance and/or the development of a single
low-income housing project.
City of Parma,504 F. Supp. at 924.
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monitor the order. 69 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
district court's findings of fact ° and upheld all aspects of the
remedy except the requirement that a specific number of units be
71
built and the appointment of a special master.
The circuit court gave surprisingly little reason for reversing the
setting of a specific number, noting only that "we believe that no
particular number should be required at this time, but that a goal
of meeting the need for such housing within a reasonable time
should be established by the [fair housing] committee."7 2 The
court applied an "exceeding its authority" yardstick for measuring
the appropriateness of the remedy.7 3 Given the facts of the case,
the trial court's equitable order should have been found well within
this standard. Even if the "housing need" as determined by HUD
were 50% too high, the 138 annual units would only satisfy ten
percent of Parma's low-income housing deficit.74 At this level, it
would still have taken ten years to counter the quantitative effects
of Parma's discrimination. Likewise, the appointment of a special
master has precedent in the Gautreaux case, 75 and was subsequent69 See City of Parma, 504 F. Supp. at 924 n.17 (recognizing the obstacles

encountered in Gautreaux);see also id. at 926 (noting that "[t]he ultimate responsibility
for the success of the remedial plan in this litigation lies with the City of Parma").
70 See United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562, 570 (6th Cir. 1981).
71 See id. at 577-78. A district court order requiring a specific number of assisted
housing units to be built was also at issue in Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d
1055 (4th Cir. 1982). At the time of the case, Clarkton was an unincorporated
municipality of 664 people, 88% white, in one of the poorest counties in North
Carolina. See id. at 1060. Forty percent of all families qualified for federally
subsidized low-income housing. See id. at 1061. The per-capita income was $4,261
(African-Americans average $1,722). See id. The district court found that the Town
Commissioners/defendants, in violating the FHA, had bowed to racially motivated
public pressure by ordering the town's withdrawal from a multi-municipality housing
project, thereby blocking the construction of 50 low-income public housing units in
Clarkton. See id. at 1063. The lower court remedy required the town itself (and
alternatively, the individual defendants) to construct the 50 units within the town
limits whether or not it could obtain federal financing. See id. at 1067. The circuit
court modified this part of the order and construed it as "requiring the defendants
to take each and every step, short of directly funding actual construction, necessary
to facilitate the development of low-rent housing in Clarkton." Id. at 1070. The
court reasoned that Clarkton's lack of financial resources made it impractical to
undertake the construction on its own. See id. at 1069. Further, the Circuit Court
felt that the defendants themselves were "people of good will" but that they were
victims of"aggressively mounted public opinion pressure" by "[c]itizens of ill will."
Id. at 1068.
72 City of Parma,661 F.2d at 578.
73 See id. at 576.
74 See City of Parma, 504 F. Supp. at 923 (accepting HUD's determination that
Parma's low-income housing need was 2669 units).
75 See Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 384 F. Supp. 37, 38 (N.D. Ill. 1974);
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ly ordered and upheld in the remedy to East Texas's segregated
public housing system under similar circumstances. 76 The Sixth
Circuit's aversion to mandating and enforcing the construction of
a specific number of units infuses fatal vagueness into the remedy
77
and invites its frustration.
The preceding cases illustrate two points. First, if housing
integration is considered by the FHA to be an end in itself, the postGautreaux courts have been extremely slow to implement it on a
broad scale, despite being confronted with egregious violations of
the FHA and the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, even assuming
that large-scale integration could be freed from racist conceptions
of what constitutes valid community in order to render it a
legitimate goal of the FHA, the token scale of court-ordered
integration relative to the magnitude of the violations undermines
the assumption. Scattered-site housing in minute quantities is an
inefficacious sprinkle of a cure on a massive disease. The idea that
even the most minimal dose of integration will benefit nonwhite
tenants is inherently discriminatory: small infusions of mostly
nonwhite assisted persons into white areas hardly eradicates
discrimination where the bulk of assisted persons remains in
segregated housing and the few relocated to scattered-site clusters
are merely remarginalized by virtue of their systemic isolation.
Essentially, the courts in the cases discussed above seem constrained
to order integration, no matter how narrow the scope, because they
perceive no judicially manageable alternative on the remedial
78
horizon.
mandamus denied, Chicago Hous. Auth. v. Austin, 511 F.2d 82, 86 (7th Cir. 1975).
76 In the East Texas segregation case, the district court appointed a special master
"to monitor and report on HUD's desegregation efforts, to study the operation of the
publicly funded housing programs in East Texas, and to recommend further action
that might be taken as part of a comprehensive remedial decree." Young v. Pierce,
640 F. Supp. 1476, 1477 (E.D. Tex. 1986), vacated and remanded on othergrounds, 822
F.2d 1368 (5th Cir. 1987) (remanding to clarify the scope of the special master's
powers).
77 See A. Dan Tarlock, Remedying the Irremediable: The Lessons of Gautreaux, 64
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 573, 579, 582 (1988) ("There has been a tendency for courts to
trim the right to fit the remedy, thus diluting the force of the underlying right ....
Political resistance to racial integration is a given; almost every remedy will have to
be enforced in the face of hostile opposition."); see also Gene B. Sperling,Judicial
Right Declaration and Entrenched Discrimination, 94 YALE LJ. 1741, 1742 (1985)
(arguing that "judges should conceptually and procedurally bifurcate their
determination of right and remedy" and formulate remedies so that disputes about
remedies do not work to narrow individual rights).
78 Cf Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theoty
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VOLUNTARY REMEDIES: THE LEGAL RATIFICATION OF "TIPPING"

"[W]e know of hardly a more suppressive move that governments
can take in this society, than to control where we can live. Would
any other people in this Country even be thought of as fit subjects
for such policies? And, would any other People not raise holy hell
at the very thought that they should be shunted around from area
to area, in the interests of satisfying white fear that whites will flee
79
an area (or decline to move in)?"
Consistent with judicial approval of limited forced integration
as the only remedy to discrimination in subsidized housing and the
resulting devaluation of the notion of nonwhite community as a
legitimate entity has been the reification and validation of the racist
dynamic known as "white flight" or "tipping" in subsidized housing
jurisprudence. "Tipping" has been defined as the theory that "every
community has a 'tipping point,' a specifiable numerical ratio of
blacks [and other nonwhite groups] to whites beyond which the rate
of white migration out of a transitional area will increase rapidly,
eventually yielding a predominantly black community."80 The
existence of a "tipping point" is the asserted justification for using
ceiling quotas to contain the proportion of nonwhite residents in a
project, which prevents the "white flight" that would ensue if the
nonwhite population grew to excess.
The proposition is theoretically unsound. It draws upon an
anglocentric binary view of ethnicity with whites at one pole and
everyone of color (e.g., African-Americans, Hispanics, AsianAmericans, Native Americans8 l ) at the other. The courts that have
considered "tipping" have never challenged the polarity of this
view.

of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1091-101 (1991) (arguing that the
judiciary's search for a core value in the 1965 Voting Rights Act has resulted in a

narrow focus on vindicating the consistent election of African-American officials to
the detriment of the original goals of the Act and the civil rights movement: voter
participation,
effective representation, and policy responsiveness).
79
John M. Goering, Introduction to HOUSING DESEGREGATION, supra note 15, at
15 n.3 (quoting letter written to the NAACP).

" Note, Tipping the Scales ofJustice: A Race-Conscious Remedy for Neighborhood
Transition, 90 YALE L.J. 377, 379 (1980); see also Derrick A. Bell,Jr., Application of the
"Tipping Point" Principle to Law Faculty HiringPolicies, 10 NovA L. REv. 319, 324
(1986) (finding that "[c]ourts have approved the policy on the grounds that it furthers
the national goal of integrated housing").
"1The terms themselves are ethnocentric amalgamations of widely differing
cultures.
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Social science support for the actual existence of "tipping" is, at
best, mixed.8 2 The most that can be asserted is that white flight
may occur to some degree. Justifying minority ceiling quotas in the
The
face of such amorphous information seems irrational.
stigmatization of nonwhites by the acceptance of this proposition is
severe.8 3 Judicial ratification of a concept that is so obviously
generated by racist fears cannot be tolerated under equal protection.

84

82 One scholar finds white flight discernable only insofar as it is a continuous
outmigration of white residents from the cities to the suburbs. SeeJohn M. Goering,
Neighborhood Tipping andRacial Transition:A Review ofSocialScience Evidence, 44 AM.
INST. PLAN..J. 68, 70 (1978). He concludes that within specific urban or suburban
neighborhoods there is uno social science evidence that supports the existence of a
single, universally applicable tipping point which can explain and predict the point
at which neighborhoods will irreversibly change from white to nonwhite." Id. at 69.
In the school desegregation context, one study found that "from 1967 to 1972, no
statistically significant relationship between racial desegregation and loss of white
students could be demonstrated, whether in the North or the South, in large or small
urban districts." Thomas F. Pettigrew & Robert L. Green, Urban Desegregationand
White Flight: A Response to Coleman, in NEW PERSPEcTivEs ON SCHOOL INTEGRATION
124, 126 (Murray Friedman et al. eds., 1979) [hereinafter NEW PERSPECTIVES] (citing
Reynolds Farley, RacialIntegrationin the PublicSchools, 1967 to 1972, SoC. Focus,Jan.
1975, at 3, 3-26. But see Bruce L. Ackerman, IntegrationforSubsidized Housingand the
Question of Racial Occupancy Controls, 26 STAN. L. REv. 245,251-60 (1974) (describing
the "tipping phenomenon" and offering statistical evidence of its operation in
California and Nevada subsidized housing projects); see also id. at 254 (noting that
'expert estimations of tipping points rang[e] from 25 percent black to 60 percent
black" (citing Victor S. Navasky, The Benevolent Housing Quota, 6 How. L.J. 30
(1960))).
83 Cf Richard A. Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An
Approach to the Topics, 24 UCLA L. REV. 581, 593 (1977) (noting that "[t]he primary
evil of [segregation is that it has] designedly and effectively marked off all black
persons as degraded, dirty, less than fully developed persons who were unfit for full
membership in the political, social, and moral community").
84 Under City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), a "strict
scrutiny" analysis will invalidate a "benign" race-conscious program that employs a
quota, even if a compelling interest is found in redressingpast specific governmental
discrimination, because a quotawill always fail the "narrowly tailored" tier of the test.
Moreover, the Croson Court dealt with a program that employed an access, not a
ceiling quota, and was remedial in the sense that it aimed to benefit minorities. The
only persons benefited by a ceiling quota to avoid the "tipping" of a project are
whites seeking to discourage their communities from becoming "too black." The
assertion that nonwhites are benefited in the long run from the "privilege" of living
among whites in a balanced ratio-maintained at the cost of nonwhites waiting longer
for subsidized apartments than whites-is patently discriminatory. Yet this is the only
rationale for allowing ceiling quotas to retard "white flight" that could possibly survive
Croson. The devaluation of nonwhites as desirable neighbors invoked by this
justification surely runs counter to Croson's strict aversion to stigma: "Classifications
based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm." Id. at 493.
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court has mandated that the
judiciary take a long-run view of a world beyond discrimination to
avoid crystallizing racist currents into precedent.8 5 The courts
cannot be institutions that merely react to and therefore reify racist
fears. Rather, courts must be moral leaders by granting relief that
forges a standard for race relations and does not resign itself to the
sorry state of present affairs. 8 6 Even if "white flight" could be
articulated definitively by social scientists, it is wholly inappropriate
for courts to shape remedies around racist responses, quickening
them into concrete law.
A. Tipping and Balancing: The Persistence of the Otero Rule
Two propositions have emerged from the cases discussing the
use of ceiling quotas to maintain integration in assisted housing:
one, "tipping" and "white flight" are valid considerations in
determining the legality of such quotas;8 7 and two, although strict
85 See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958) (holding community opposition
irrelevant to African-Americans' right to integrated facilities in Little Rock, Arkansas
school desegregation case), discussed in Derrick A. Bell, The Dialectics of School
Desegregation, 32 ALA. L. REV. 281, 287 (1981).
86 See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) ("Private biases may be outside
the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect."); see
also Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60,81 (1917) (reasoning that preservation of public
peace cannot justify legal recognition of acknowledged racial prejudice).
87 In Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979), the Court,
in the process of holding that Bellwood and various "testers" had standing to
challenge the invidious "steering" practices of real estate brokers, lent its imprimatur
to "white flight." The Gladstone plaintiffs alleged that the steering of black
prospective home buyers toward a neighborhood of mixed racial composition and
their white counterparts toward a largely white neighborhood "affect[ed] the village's
racial composition, replacing what is presently an integrated neighborhood with a
segregated one." Id. at 110. Writing for the Court, Justice Powell reasoned:
The adverse consequences attendant upon a 'changing' neighborhood can
be profound. If petitioners' steering practices significantly reduce the total
number of buyers in the Bellwood housing market, prices may be deflected
downward. This phenomenon would be exacerbated ifperceptibleincreases in the
minoritypopulationdirectly attributableto racialsteeringprecipitatean exodus of
white residents.
Id. (emphasis added).
In the school desegregation context, the Second Circuit has expressly recognized
"tipping." In Parent Ass'n of AndrewJackson High School v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705
(2d Cir. 1979), the court approved a voluntary desegregation plan that placed a 50%
ceiling on African-American students attending any formerly white school in order
to quell white fears that the school would become all minority. The court reasoned:
"Although white fears about the admission of minority students are ugly, those fears
cannot be disregarded without imperiling integration across the entire system." Id.
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scrutiny is ostensibly the proper instrument for evaluating these
programs, a ceiling quota on minorities can stand where the
asserted community interest in not "tipping" is large enough. The
cases adumbrate the rule that a community's interest in not being
"tipped" can legitimize a ceiling quota for minorities within a
housing project if the "community" is defined to encompass the
geographic neighborhood surrounding the project, rather than just
the project itself.
This Section argues that "tipping" is an impermissible consideration in the judicial calculus and that the stigma engendered by
ceiling quotas is so discriminatory and disadvantageous to minorities that it fails miserably under any constitutional affirmative action
analysis. The cases in this Section share essentially the same basic
facts: the defendants maintained a ceiling quota within a housing
project and justified it with the claim that absent such a quota the
project or the surrounding area would "tip" and become all
8
nonwhite. 8
Otero v. New York City Housing Authority89 is the grandparent of
this line of cases and the only one to permit a minority ceiling quota
to stand. Although the courts in the cases following had the
opportunity to overrule or directly contradict Otero they have left its
core intact, merely distinguishing it. 90 The issue in Otero was
whether the New York City Housing Authority's maintenance of a
ceiling quota on nonwhites in the rent-up of a new housing project

at 720.
" Yinger notes that ceiling quotas seem like a costless way of diverting nonwhite
demand to maintain an integrated project with a lower proportion of nonwhites. See
Yinger, supranote 26, at 303. But, in addition to the moral price, there are economic
costs to ceiling quotas: nonwhites must bear the costs of a longer search for housing,
they will probably pay more for housing because of the discriminatory frictions in the
market; and the areas where the new demand is diverted may exact higher prices as
a result of that greater demand. See id.
89 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973).
go See infra notes 96-131 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has never
directly addressed the question of tipping, although it did confront the opportunity
12 years ago in a Dallas school desegregation case. See Tasby v. Estes, 412 F. Supp.
1192 (N.D. Tex. 1976), remanded, 572 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. grantedsubnom.
Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of the Dallas NAACP, 440 U.S. 906 (1979), cert.
dismissed, 444 U.S. 437 (1980). In Tasby, civil rights lawyers challenged an allnonwhite school sub-district and the existence of fifty single-race schools outside of
the sub-district on the basis that it was possible to desegregate the entire district.
Defendants argued that white flight would negate any efforts at desegregation. The
trial court held for the defendants, the Fifth Circuit remanded, and the Supreme
Court heard oral argument twice before dismissing certiorari as improvidently
granted. See Bell, supra note 85, at 295.
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in an urban renewal area was justified by the interest in "prevent[ing] racial imbalance in the project and in the surrounding
community." 9 1 The Second Circuit reversed summary judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs, announcing the supremacy of the FHA duty
to integrate over the duty to eliminate discrimination: "The [New
York City Housing] Authority is obligated to take affirmative steps
to promote racial integration even though this may in some
instances not operate to the immediate advantage of some nonwhite persons." 92 This rule is made clearer by translating its
negative phrasing: integration is an obligation even though it may
operate to disadvantagenonwhites.93 The discrimination inherent in
the devaluation of nonwhite choice is clear in the court's pronouncement that "[t]he affirmative duty.., to promote the policy
of fair, integrated housing is not to be put aside whenever racial
minorities are willing to accept segregated housing."94 The implication
of this rule is that nonwhites may not legitimately elect to live within
95
predominantly nonwhite communities.
In United States v. Starrett City Associates, 96 the Second Circuit,
striking down a minority ceiling quota, expressly distinguished but
did not overrule Otero. Otero's underlying balancing principle
survives Starrett City and the other cases discussed in this Section:
where the community interested in capping the number of nonwhite
91 Otero, 484 F.2d at 1128 (emphasis added). HUD had relocated 1852 families,
60% of whom were nonwhite, that had lived in an "Urban Renewal Area" recently
acquired by the City. These relocated families were granted first priority in the
project being constructed. When the 360 new leases became available, 27% (rather
than the expected 4%) of the displaced tenants reapplied for apartments. See id. at
1126. The Housing Authority disregarded its own regulations and preferred white
newcomers to nonwhite displaced tenants, creating a 40% nonwhite to 60% white
ratio that would have been 80% nonwhite to 20% white without the ceiling quota. See
id. at 1128. The district court granted summaryjudgment to the plaintiffs. See Otero
v. New York City Hous. Auth., 354 F. Supp. 941 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 484 F.2d 1122 (2d
Cir. 1973).
92 Otero, 484 F.2d at 1125.
93 It is interesting to consider the structure of a system that privileges integration
absolutely, even where it is maintained by a method tainted by discrimination.
Nietzsche elicited the contradictions inherent in any system that maintains itself
through precisely the means which it excludes in order to define itself. Another
example is the maintenance of a system of "law and order" that excludes violence by
means of police and punishment methods that employ violent force. See FRIEDRICH
NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORAis 97-129 (Walter Kaufmann & R.J.
Hollingdale trans., 1969).
94 Otero, 484 F.2d at 1134 (emphasis added).
95
This view's ramifications are discussed infra notes 133-185 and accompanying
text.
96 840 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988).
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residents is defined broadly enough (i.e. to include the region
surrounding the project), it will outweigh the competing interest of
nonwhites in not being burdened by stigmatizing quotas.
"Starrett City" is a housing project in Brooklyn, New York,
composed of forty-six high-rises containing 5,881 apartments that
rents almost exclusively to subsidized moderate- and middle-income
tenants. 97 Defendant-management maintained a strict racial quota
of 64% whites, 22% African-Americans, and 8% Hispanics. 98 The
community interest that defendants asserted to justify the quota was
"prevent[ing] the loss of white tenants, which would transform
Starrett City into a predominantly minority complex." 99 Thus in
Starrett City, the community interest was confined to preventing
white flight only within the project itself; in Otero, the community
interest encompassed the surrounding community, a much broader
geographic area.
The Starrett City court, striking down the racial quotas, did not
engage in an intensive strict or intermediate level scrutiny analysis
and thereby left Otero standing.1 0 0 If the court had taken into
account the intervening Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke °1 and Fullilove v. Klutznick1 0 2 decisions, it would have
recognized that those cases effectively overruled Otero. Instead, it
distinguished Otero by noting that Otero "only applied to a single
event-the initial rent up of the new complexes."1 0
Still, the
court discerned an urgency in Otero's preservation of a "precarious
racial balance" to prevent "the immediate creation of a 'pocket
ghetto'" that would "inevitabl[y]" cause "'non-white ghettoization'"
10 4
of the Lower East Side (a broad geographic area).
97 See id. at 1098.
98 See id. African-Americans waited ten times longer than whites for two-bedroom
apartments and almost three times longer on average for one-bedroom apartments.
See id. at 1104 (Newman, J., dissenting).
99 Id. at 1098.
100 See id. at 1101-03.

101 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (applying strict scrutiny to invalidate racial quota in school
admission plan).
102 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (finding that programs employing racial or ethnic criteria
must be narrowly tailored to remedy defects of past discrimination).
1o Starrett City, 840 F.2d at 1103.
10 4 Id. (quoting Otero, 484 F. 2d at 1124). The "immediacy" and "inevitability" that
Judge Miner refers to is wholly absent from the Otero opinion: Otero found that nonwhite concentration would "eventually" or "further" occur on the Lower East Side of
Manhattan. See Otero, 484 F.2d at 1124-25. In addition,Judge Miner's ratification of
Otero blatantly outdated and racist language-"non-white ghettoization"-is
disturbing. The implication is that wherever nonwhites (whatever the composition
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The Starrett City court also tried to distinguish Otero on the
ground that Starrett City did not aim "to remedy past racial
discrimination or imbalance within the complex."10 5 The Otero
quota, however, did not aim to remedy past discrimination. In
addition, the suggestion that Starrett City would be decided
differently had its quota been deemed "remedial" misses the point
of Fullilove and Bakke's "past discrimination" requirements. As
mentioned above, those cases involved quotas aimed to assist, not
deter, nonwhite access to a program.
B. The Rule Applied
Although Burney v. Housing Authority10 6 struck down a quotabased tenanting plan under a strict scrutiny analysis, the court
indicated explicitly that the opposite result would have been
reached had the community interest side of the balancing equation
been defined more broadly. 10 7 The Burney court avoided determining whether the duty to integrate was a compelling governmen0 8 by finding that the Beaver plan was not narrowly
tal interest"
1° 9
tailored.

of this vast group) live together a "ghetto" is created.
105 Starrett City, 840 F.2d at 1102.
106 551 F. Supp. 746 (W.D. Pa. 1982).
107
See id. at 749. The Housing Authority of the County of Beaver, Pennsylvania
managed 1040 family public housing units in sixteen projects located in five
geographic districts. The Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission filed a formal
complaint against the Housing Authority, charging that the Authority maintained
projects segregated by race. By consent decree the Authority and the Commission
agreed to desegregate the projects. See id. at 749-50. The method adopted was to set
a "target racial balance" equal to the ratio of Blacks to whites in the Beaver public
housing system as a whole. When a project deviated from the "target racial balance"
tenants of the race whose numbers were deficient would be preferred over tenants
whose race was in excess of the target ratio. See id. at 750.
10
See id. at 764. The court, however, did draw an analogy to the school
desegregation cases, and it disagreed with Otero, arguing that "there is no precedent
for the . .. conclusion that the government has a constitutionallyprescribedaffirmative
action obligation to achieve integration in public housing." Id. at 761 (emphasis in
original to distinguish statutory duty imposed by the FHA).
109 See id. at 765. The court reasoned that the five geographic districts were
themselves segregated by race, adding:
Applicants for housing are placed on waiting lists for projects located in the
district where they reside. Thus, a district with a large black population
obviously will have a high percentage of black applicants.... [T]he
defendant could overcome its ... problem by establishing a countywide
waiting list that lists applicants ... throughout the county.... [T]he
potential for tipping caused by having a large percentage of minority
applicants ... would be eliminated because applicants would be dispersed
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The court ignored its strict scrutiny analysis, however, in carving out
the persisting Otero exception. The ceiling quota in Burney was
predicated on the prevention of tipping solely within the individual
projects.110 The defendants made no claim that the quotas were
based on their fear that "white flight" would precipitate in the
surrounding community.11 1 The court then applied the Otero
rule: "The Housing Authority... did not meet its burden of
proving at trial that any existing integratedcommunities were in danger
of tipping because of the percentage of blacks residing in projects
located therein."112 The court further explained that "the Housing
Authority must be cognizant of this distinction between neighbor115
hood.., and public housing project transition."
The Burney court revealed its acceptance of tipping in being
persuaded by the absence of convincing evidence that tipping would
have occurred in the Beaver projects. 114 The court took judicial
notice of the specious suggestion that "the tipping point is probably
considerably higher in low-income housing projects than in
residential neighborhoods." 115 This suggests that the court would
have ruled differently had stronger evidence been presented that
tipping would occur in the projects, especially if the defendants had
shown that "resegregation in the area would almost surely [have]
11 6
result[ed] in the absence of an integration ceiling."
The court in United States v. Charlottesville Redevelopment and
Housing Authority1 17 did not even reach a strict scrutiny test in
striking down a 50% ceiling quota for African-American tenants in
a Charlottesville public housing project. The court realized that

throughout the county rather than being concentrated in one [segregated]
district.
Id. at 765. Thus, if the Authority's paramount concern was rapid desegregation with
the least intrusion on the right of nonwhite groups to be free from stigma/
discrimination, the county-wide plan was the obvious solution.
110 The Housing Authority maintained "that the use of a racial access quota
[(ceiling quota)] will effectively prevent resegregation by keeping the number of
blacksjust below the point at which white exodus from and/or white refusal to reside
in particular projects is expected to occur." Id. at 758.
11 Such a claim was probably not made because those communities were already
segregated. See id. at 765.
112
Id. (emphasis added).
113 Id. at 767.
114 See id. (noting that "[f]or example, the Mt. Washington project lost only one
white family from 1975-1981 despite the fact that the project was 75% black").
115 Id.
116 Id. at 766 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
117 718 F. Supp. 461 (W.D. Va. 1989).
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ceiling quotas "seek[] to remedy past discrimination against
blacks ...

with more discrimination against blacks,"11 8 that the

"unexamined assumption in the Act's legislative history that the
principles of nondiscrimination and integration will always... go
hand in hand" is misguided, 119 and that underlying the "cataclysmic language [of "tipping" discourse] depict[ing] what may occur if
a plan giving preference to white applicants does not continue...
lies the implicit suggestion that an all black housing constituency is
somehow a more enfeebled community." 120 The court reasoned
that when there is a legal and moral conflict between integration
and anti-discrimination, "the obligation.., to avoid discrimination
must 'trump' [the] obligation to promote integration" whenever
ceiling quotas are involved.1 2 1 Despite the sensitivity of this
analysis, the Charlottesvillecourt acquiesced in the Otero/StarrettCity

rule, affirming the principle that tipping could be a valid justification for upholding a ceiling quota where there is "a threat not
simply to the public housing complex but a threat of tipping
presented to the entire neighborhood." 122 In the case, however,
the interest in promoting white residency was confined to the
project itself; it did not encompass the community at large.
Therefore, the quota was struck down for lack of a sizable enough
asserted interest.

123

'I1
119 Id. at 469.
Id. at 467.

120 Id. at 466-67 n.10.
121 Id. at 468.
122 Id. at 466 (citing Otero, 484 F.2d at 1135-36).
12s The Charlottesvillecourt identified the stigma created by the quotas as the fact
that "black applicants for spaces in the public housing projects .. have had to wait
considerably longer than white applicants" for vacant apartments. Id. at 462. A prior
and more elementary stigmatic injury to the plaintiffs in this action, however, inhered
in the structure of the Charlottesville system. There was only one project in
Charlottesville, and it was rented entirely by African-Americans until the imposition
of the quota. Although there was "both a higher percentage of whites who need
public housing [based on income] and a larger absolute number of whites who need
public housing than blacks [in Charlottesville] ... that white constituency... [was]
thoroughly underrepresented on the lists of applicants for public housing." Id. at
470. Further, there were "limited housing opportunities available to minorities
elsewhere [in Charlottesville], due in large part to continued discrimination." Id. at
469 (citation omitted).
The court realized that the manifest reluctance of whites to enter the public
housing program reflected a situation where there is an "alleged need [that is] not
perceived or even deliberately ignored"by poor whites in Charlottesville. Id. at 470 n.14
(emphasis added). The court suggested that whites in Charlottesville simply "do not
perceive public housing as a need or as an option which is viable to them," and it
neutralized the racist foundations for their preferences by applying Yogi Berra's
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At first glance, Williamsburg FairHousing Committee v. New York
City Housing Authority12 4 seems an anomaly in the preceding line

of cases. The defendants, managers of a housing project, maintained a 75% white, 20% Hispanic, and 5% African-American ratio
within the Bedford Gardens housing project, although only 30% of
the applicant pool was white. 125 The defendants justified the
quota at trial by arguing that its purpose was to prevent tipping the
surrounding area. The court found that the tipping argument was
an eleventh-hour justification and was not part of the defendant's
126
actual plan, and, on this reasoning, invalidated the quota.
Thus, Williamsburg, too, is consistent with the Otero rule.
Despite arguing "surrounding area tipping" as ajustification for
a ceiling quota, in City of Shaker Heights v. Shaker Heights Housing

Associates the plaintiffs lost.127 The court invalidated a racial
ceiling quota not because of its inherent devaluation of nonwhites
as desirable neighbors, but because the court found that "tipping is
not a relevant concern" since the surrounding area was already 96%
African-American. 128 Although counsel for defendants argued
aphorism: "Ifthe people don't want to come out to the ballpark, nobody's going to
stop them." Id. This dicta essentially sanctions a system that is stigmatizing with and
without quotas. As in Burney, there is a more effective and less stigmatizing remedy
to the segregation in the challenged public housing system. Integration could be
better achieved by not concentrating all public housing for minorities in one area,
especially considering the "limited housing opportunities available ... elsewhere,"
and also by building among the white community. Id. at 469.
124 493 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
125 See id. at 1237. This quota was strictly applied by apartment size, building, and
floor. Whites were shown preferred treatment; management met with them more
frecuently and assigned them nearly all the four-bedroom apartments. See id. at 1251.
126 See id. at 1249-50. Management asserted that it was relying on a Department
of Housing Preservation and Development plan to maintain a level of integration in
the area, but there was no evidence that the Department had such a plan, and in any
case, the Department made no argument that it was currently acting to prevent
tipping.
See id.
127
No. C85-9, (N.D. Ohio Jan. 23, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist File). See
generally Isabel Wilkerson, One City's 30-Year Crusadefor Integration,N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
30, 1991, at Al. This article discusses Shaker Heights, Ohio's efforts to maintain
integrated neighborhoods through subsidized mortgage programs in which members
of a racial group are rewarded for moving into a neighborhood where their group is
underrepresented. Ninety percent of loans go to whites since few nonwhites can
afford real estate in the "districts surrounding the country club." Id. The article
notes that "[s]ome black residents see [this] as a degrading approach" and quotes one
as feeling that "[w]hen a city will pay to get blacks to move to another community, it
sends a powerful message.... They will do anything to get white people here. The
city is bribing them to live next to blacks." Id.
128 Shaker Heights, No. C85-9, at *9.
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that the interest in not being tipped extended to the surrounding
area, that interest weighed very little in the balancing equation
because the white community's interest in holding down the
nonwhite population in a predominantly nonwhite area was very
12 9
small (in fact, it was not even "relevant").
Shaker Heights illustrates well the racist underpinnings of the
tipping concept and highlights its inadequacy as ajudicial standard.
The project, Campbell Court, was originally planned to provide
housing for elderly tenants. Because elderly low-income housing
tenants tend to be white, the parties anticipated that the project
would be approximately 75% white and 25% nonwhite.13 0 After
viewing a sign at the construction site and reading about the
upcoming groundbreaking, however, 500 applicants signed up of
whom 63% were nonwhite. Faced with "segregation" in a project
designed to be "integrated," the city sued to enjoin mailing of
acceptance letters, requesting an enforced 75-25 white-to-nonwhite
quota, which they argued would reflect the "racially balanced"
13 1
proportions of the city as a whole.
The underlying racism in the tipping discourse is evident. The
city deems a 75% white project "integrated" and desirable, while a
63% nonwhite project is "segregated" and undesirable. 132 The
presumption that nonwhites are the devalued element in the mix is
unavoidable. Furthermore, the City's formulation relies on the
notion that a concentration of 75% whites in a predominantly
nonwhite neighborhood will not cause tipping, because the implicit
valuation of white over nonwhite will not lead to any "nonwhite
flight." In addition, the idea that properly "balanced" communities
must have racial proportions reflective of society as a whole robs
nonwhite institutions of any claim to equal footing and relegates
them to the margins.

129 See id. at *10. On this reasoning, had the project been built in a white area
tipping would have been a relevant concern.
'30 See id. at *4.

'3' See id. at *5-*6.
1s2 See Carlo E. Porcelli, Promoting Minority Neighborhoods, Not Integration,
(Feb. 14, 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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III. THE RECOGNITION OF NONWHITE COMMUNITY IN VOLUNTARY
REMEDIES: JUDICIAL RETREAT FROM THE INTEGRATION MINDSET

The previous Section illustrated how judicial obsession with the
goal of integration resulted in treatment of remedies to public
housing segregation that sacrificed the anti-discrimination goal of
the FHA and equal protection. The discriminatory tipping rationale
was sanctioned as a legitimate consideration in the question of how
best to achieve integration. The well-meaning goal of integration
became discriminatory because the means for achieving it (through
consideration of tipping) were inherently discriminatory. This
Section explores how, through the process of subsidized housing
site selection, the exclusive pursuit of neighborhood integration can
inflict discriminatory stigma on nonwhite community.
The first case to consider a challenge to the proposed construction of federally subsidized housing in a nonwhite area was Shannon
v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development.'3 3

The plaintiffs were residents of an urban renewal area in Philadelphia who challenged the construction of "Fairmont Manor," an
apartment project, claiming that "the location of this type of project
on the site chosen will have the effect of increasing the already high
concentration of low income black residents in the [urban renewal
area]."13 4 The Third Circuit found that HUD had only minimal
procedures in place for considering the effects of housing placement on racial concentration.1 3 5 It held these procedures to be
inadequate and reversed the lower court's dismissal of the complaint, ordering HUD to "utilize some institutionalized method
whereby, in considering site selection... it has before it the
relevant racial and socioeconomic information necessary for
compliance with its duties under the 1964 and 1968 Civil Rights
136
Acts."
The Third Circuit's holding in Shannon had the effect of
forbidding HUD and local PHAs from locating subsidized housing
solely in nonwhite areas.1 3 7 It established the principle that
133 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970).
134 Id. at 811-12.

135 See id. at 820-21.
136 Id. at 821.
137 See id. at 820. Oddly enough, considering its progressive effect, the Shannon
court couched its rationale in discriminatory terms:
[After] 1964 the administrations of the federal housing programs could [no
longer] ... remain blind to the very real effect that racial concentration has
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discrimination "could arise by virtue of the undue concentration of
persons of a given race, or socio-economic group in a given
neighborhood"1 38 resulting solely from the choice of location for
a given project. HUD adopted this language in 1972, codifying it
into new site selection regulations that effectively banished new
13 9
construction from nonwhite areas.
The regulations have two prongs. The first prohibits new
projects from being located in an area of "minority concentration,"
with two exceptions: the project can be built in such an area if
there are "sufficient, comparable opportunities" for minority
families in white areas, or if the project is "necessary to meet
overriding housing needs which cannot otherwise feasibly be met in
that.., area."140 The second prong stipulates that a site must
"promote greater choice of housing opportunities and avoid undue
concentration of assisted persons in areas containing a high
141
proportion of low-income persons."
These regulations are too extreme in mandating that HUD avoid
nonwhite areas when creating new housing opportunities. While
dispersal of subsidized housing into suburban and white areas is
essential for expanding the access of assisted tenants to a better
social services network, more latitude is needed to enable nonwhites
to choose to remain within racially and ethnically unified neighborhoods and to rehabilitate those communities, rather than being
forced to abandon them. This is not merely a matter of policy:
had [on] urban blight.... Increase or maintenance of racial concentration
is prima facie likely to lead to urban blight and is thus prima facie at
variance with the national housing policy.
Id. at 820-21.
138 Id. at 820.
139 See 24 C.F.R. § 880.206 (1991) (detailing site selection for Section 8 New
Construction) (formerly § 880.112); id. § 941.202 (setting forth site selection for
construction under federal Public Housing programs); see also Robert C. Farrell,

Integrating by Discriminating: Affirmative Action That DisadvantagesMinorities, 62 U.
DET. L. REV. 553, 567 (1985) (discussing HUD's present policy of preferring to deny
housing to needy families rather than promote a "segregated" housing system); Duane
P. Landreth, FourElements-PlanningCitizen Participation,HousingAssistanceandA-95
Review-Under Title I of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 9 URB.

LAW. 61, 108 (1977) (contending that the preamble to the 1974 Housing and
Community Development Act is the statutory recognition of Shannon).
140 24 C.F.R. § 880.206(c)(1) (1991).

141 Id. § 880.206(d). The regulations themselves validate "tipping" as a consideration. See, e.g., id. § 880.206(c)(2) ("The site must not be located in... [a] racially
mixed area if the project will cause a significant increase in the proportion of
minority to non-minority residents in the area.").
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permitting nonwhite choice is required by the anti-discrimination
142
goal of the FHA and by equal protection.
The dispersal necessitated by the regulations also acts to dilute
nonwhite political strength. Whereas the theory motivating current
remedies to subsidized housing discrimination is that minorities are
better off scattered among the larger white population, current
voting rights jurisprudence advocates concentration over dispersal
as the preferred vehicle for augmenting minority voting
14 3
strength.
The HUD regulation, like the judicial reflex of ordering
integration, is well-meaning, especially in light of the historical
reality that most segregated communities are the product of
invidious forces. HUD and the courts should now recognize that
the choice of nonwhite groups to remain in group-concentrated
neighborhoods may be borne out of valid cultural preferences,
rather than out of a reactive sentiment. Subsidized housing tenants,
under this view, should be able to choose better housing over
integration.
Under the present HUD regulations the choice
becomes substandard housing or integration.
142 The Shannon court explicitly cautioned that it was not creating an absolute
requirement of dispersal:
Nor are we suggesting that desegregation of housing is the only goal of the
national housing policy. There will be instances where a pressing case may
be made for the rebuilding of a racial ghetto.... [HUD may] find[] that the
need for physical rehabilitation or additional minority housing at the site in
question clearly outweighs the disadvantage of increasing or perpetuating
racial concentration.
Shannon, 436 F.2d at 822.
143 See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47-48 (1986) (finding that multimember districts and at-large voting schemes may be challenged because they may
"C'operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial [minorities in] the
voting population'" (quoting Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73,88 (1966))); Whitcomb
v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 143 (1971) (same); Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. La.
1983) (invalidating, under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, a
redistricting plan that spread African-American voting strength over two districts,
where another plan that had been rejected by the Louisiana state legislature would
have consolidated minority voting strength and virtually assured election of a
nonwhite representative); Nomination of William Bradford Reynolds To Be Associate
Attorney General of the United States: Hearings Before The Senate Committee On The
Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1985) (statement of Senator Biden) ("[T]he
rationale, by well-intentioned white folks, to say '[minorities are] really better served
having 40 percent in two districts than having a predominance in one district and
electing a Congressperson' ... is so suspect.... History indicates that that is the
rationalization that was almost always used to justify discrimination.").
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A palatable choice for subsidized housing tenants could be
provided by broadening the exceptions to the HUD regulations.
"Sufficient comparable opportunities" and "overriding need that
cannot feasibly be met" are hurdles too high to leap. 144 The rule
should be converted to a rebuttable presumption 145 that the
selection of a new subsidized housing site in an area of nonwhite
concentration is motivated by considerations that violate the antidiscrimination provisions of the FHA. The showing of genuine
need within a nonwhite community would be sufficient to rebut the
presumption.
Further, judicial recourse to integration as the only acceptable
remedy to subsidized housing segregation is produced in part by a
litigation process that fails to account for the diversity of affected
interests. 146 This problem may be as much rooted in the type of
relief plaintiffs request as it is a reflection of the institutional
limitations on the judicial role. Under a Plessy jurisprudence, the
institution actively devalued nonwhite choice.1 47 Now that the
judiciary has recognized the violation, the polar conception of the
violation/remedy structure results in an inability to recognize the
144 These requirements can be compared to the "compelling interest standard" of
strict scrutiny: it is nearly impossible to fulfill them. See Interview with Ralph Smith,
Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School, in Philadelphia, Pa. (Jan. 14,
1991).
145 Professor Smith suggested this idea of a rebuttable presumption. See id.
146 See Bell, supra note 30, at 505-07. Derrick Bell has articulated the "class action
barrier to expression of dissent":
As black disenchantment with racial balance remedies grows, the strongest
opposition to civil rights litigation strategy may come from unnamed class
members .... At one time, expressions of disinterest and even disapproval
of civil rights litigation by portions of the class may have been motivated by
fear and threats of physical and economic intimidation. But... many black
parents oppose total reliance on racial balance remedies to cure the effects
of school segregation .... Black parents who prefer alternative remedies are
poorly served by the routine approval of plaintiffs' requests for class status

[and for mandatory integration] in school desegregation litigation.

Id. (footnotes omitted). Elaborate discussion of a remedial process that accounts for
dissenting, yet affected, voices is beyond the scope of this Comment. For extensive
discussion of proposals for public law remedial techniques that account for non-party

affected interests, see Susan Sturm, A Normative Theoy of Public Law Remedies, 79
GEO. L.J. 1355 (1991).
147 See e.g., Missouri ex. rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 349 (1938) (holding
that an African-American student, who wished to attend a white law school, must be
provided legal education in an African-American school); Berea College v. Kentucky,
211 U.S. 45, 58 (1908) (upholding verdict against a college that provided instruction
for both whites and nonwhites in violation of a statute).
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legitimacy of the decision of nonwhites to remain in a nonwhite
community.
A.

Theoretical Underpinningsfor "Nonsegregated"Subsidized Housing
and the Recognition of Nonwhite Community

History raises a high presumption against nonwhites having
chosen any degree of segregation. A remedial system, however, that
fails to recognize the distinct and valid cultures of nonwhites by
forcing dispersal among the larger white community is itself
discriminatory. The trick then, is to acknowledge the reality of
discrimination while simultaneously preserving the option of a nonreactive desire for nonwhite communities.
The theoretical framework for such a remedy is what Forman
48
and Calmore call "nonsegregation."
Nonsegregation implies both the right of people to remain
indefinitely where they are, even if in ghetto areas, and the
elimination of restrictions on moving into other areas. Nonsegregation would provide for voluntary ghetto residence, while
integration could result in involuntary nonghetto residence. Only
white ethnocentrism could lead to the belief that all blacks would
149
want to live in predominantly white areas.
Under a nonsegregation analysis the conflicting social science
evidence concerning whether nonwhites in general would actually
want to remain in nonwhite areas is legally irrelevant.1 5 0
The

148 SeeJohn O. Calmore, FairHousingvs.FairHousing The Problemswith Providing
Increased Housing Opportunities Through SpatialDeconcentration, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE
REv. 7, 12 (1980).
149 ROBERT F. FORMAN, BLACK GHETTrOS, WHITE GHETTOS, AND SLUMS 46 (1971),

quoted in Calmore, supra note 148, at 12.
150 See, e.g., Reynolds Farley et al., "ChocolateCity, Vanilla Suburbs': Will the Trend
Toward Racially Separate Communities Continue?, 7 Soc. Sci. RES. 319, 328-31 (1978)
(noting a Detroit survey that indicated 17% of blacks would prefer to live in all-black
communities; only 5% preferred a predominantly white community), discussed in
Potter, supra note 25, at 1170-71. CompareAckerman, supranote 82, at 266 ("Recent
[1968 and 1969] attitude surveys suggest that a solid majority of black families favor
housing integration.") with DERRICK A. BELLJR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAw

536 & n.18 (1980) (arguing that Ackerman's finding "must be viewed with caution"
and in the context of the prospect of better housing promised by the integrationist
ideal of the post-Brown years). Bell argues further:
Most low-income blacks would prefer better housing close to their present
neighborhoods .... To the extent that integration policies... require them
to leave a black neighborhood in order to maintain public housing, blacks
may be deprived of the liberty to decide where to live, just as they were
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doctrine of equal protection must be implemented so that genuine
choice exists for nonwhites. This is all the more important in the
151
area of subsidized housing, not only for "racial utopia" reasons,
but also because integration of subsidized housing plays the peculiar
role of restricting choice under the rubric of expanding opportunity: although the anti-discrimination goal of the FHA aims to
eliminate racial barriers to mobility, once a tenant elects to receive
government housing assistance she or he surrenders the right to
choose location freely in exchange for a subsidy. 152 To the greatest degree possible then, subsidized housing programs should be
administered in a manner that avoids treading on the right to
choose, especially since the tenant is participating in the housing
program solely because of his or her diminished bargaining power.
The assumption sedimented in the HUD regulations is that an
essential ingredient for fair housing, at least in the public sphere, is
"whiteness." 15
As has been argued in the school integration
under former segregation policies.
Id. at 556 (citing Comment, 5 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 150, 156 (1970)).
151 Seesupratext accompanying note 26 (discussing theoretical precision required
in subsidized housing).
152 The degree to which mobility is surrendered varies from program to program.
Section 8 New Construction substantially restricts mobility, since this type of housing
can only be built in areas conforming to the HUD regulations. See 24 C.F.R.
§ 880.206(c) (1991) (describing applicable geographic minority concentration
standards). Section 8 Existing Housing subsidies preserve more choice, and thus are
more in line with "nonsegregation" because it is primarily up to the tenant to find an
apartment. See id. § 882.103(a). But even Section 8 Existing units must meet the
minimum standards of the program. See id. § 882.109 (describing applicable housing
quality standards). The requirements of the program are more stringent than those
set by the decennial census of housing and higher than any other developed by HUD,
the Congressional Budget Office, or the Office ofManagement and Budget. SeeJohn
C. Weicher, The Voucher/ProductionDebate, in BUILDING FOUNDATIONS, supra note 9,
at 263, 267. Many would-be recipients find it difficult to locate a unit that meets
these requirements in their neighborhood and are denied the subsidy as a result. See
LORENE YAP ET AL., LOWER INCOME HOUSING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (SECTION 8):
NATIONWIDE EVALUATION OF THE EXISTING HOUSING PROGRAM:
TECHNICAL
SUPPLEMENT 191 (1978) (indicating that 34% of those denied Section 8 assistance
despite qualifying for a certificate said that "finding a unit that would pass Section 8
inspection" was a major problem).
53 See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Defining Brown s Integration Remedy for Urban School
Systems, in NEW PERSPECTIVES, supra note 82, at 23, 24. Bell develops this idea in the
context of school integration:
The assumption that even the attaining of academic skills is worthless unless
those skills are acquired in the presence of white students illustrates
dramatically how a legal precedent... has been so constricted even by
advocates that its goal.., is rendered inaccessible, even unwanted, unless
it can be obtained through racial balancing of the school population.
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arena, the legal focus on integration as the only manageable remedy
to discrimination has eclipsed the social goal of better housing to
the detriment of those in need. 5 4 The injury of this eclipsing is
not only strangulation of the delivery mechanisms of housing
assistance,
but also the privileging of white over nonwhite communi15 5
ty.

B. Judicial Treatment of the HUD Regulations

In almost all of the cases in which the prospective building of a
new project has been challenged, claiming a violation of 24 C.F.R.
§ 880.206,156 the courts have made every effort to uphold HUD's
approval of the site. Even where the facts indicate that the area is
one where minority or assisted persons are concentrated, the courts
have found no concentration or have expanded the "overriding
need" exception to swallow the rule.
In Business Ass'n of University City v. Landrieu 57 the court

found that the prohibition against locating a site in "an area of
minority concentration" was not violated, even though a broader
definition of the relevant "area" would have resulted in a violation.

Id.
'" See Bell, supra note 85. Bell notes that district courts are willing to order
school integration, even over the protests of large numbers of African-American
parents preferring educational improvement over racial balance, possibly out of
exasperation with the frustrating avoidance tactics of resistant school boards. See id.
at 294 (discussing Liddell v. Board of Education, 469 F. Supp. 1304, 1330-32 (E.D.
Mo. 1979) (ordering further integration despite evidence of affected AfricanAmerican families who preferred "neighborhood" all-African-American schools over
busing)); id. at 287 (discussing Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 616 F.2d
805 (5th Cir. 1980) (ordering integration despite 3,000 signatures in support of a
petition to save Tuscaloosa's all-African-American Druid High School)). Bell suggests
that Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), stood not only for an
integration creed, but also for an education creed. Thus, he argues that integrationists, though pursuing a "praiseworthy goal," should recognize that the goal of
promoting the education of minorities can and should be achieved without
integration. See Bell, supra note 85, at 283-86.
'55 Two commentators argue that nonwhites will endure racial integration as a byproduct of achieving other goals (e.g., access to quality education, responsive police
and fire departments, regular garbage collection, low crime rates, good road
maintenance), but may not be willing to accept it as a goal in itself. See Leigh &
McGhee, supra note 53, at 34-37. These commentators contend that "[r]esidential
racial integration per se is not now and may never have been the desideratum among
blacks. The more fundamental concern among black Americans has been freedom
from impediments to the fulfillment of their human potential." Id. at 34.
156 See supra notes 140-141 and accompanying text.
157 660 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1981).
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The proposed site in West Philadelphia was located at the northern
border of a census tract which was only 13.9% nonwhite, but the
adjacent tracts were 23.7% nonwhite (to the west), 65.3% nonwhite
(to the north), and 98.4% nonwhite (to the northwest).1 58 In
addition, there were two other housing projects predominantly
minority occupied, one directly across the street from the proposed
site (50% nonwhite, 448 units) and the other nearby (92% nonwhite,
84 units). 159 The court, in an opinion by Judge Higginbotham,
refused to review substantively HUD's decision because there was no
demonstration that HUD had made a "'clear error in judgment in
defining the relevant area.'" 160 The court held that HUD had
"considered the proximity of the already existing low income
housing sites and minority impacted census tracts," 16 1 and
"thoughtfully weigh[ed] the question of racial impact," 162 pursuant to the Shannon court's directives and the resulting HUD
16
regulations, and therefore upheld the HUD site selection. 3
The University City decision reveals a reluctance to read the
HUD regulations literally and represents a retreat from the absolute
mandate to integrate. Judge Higginbotham encapsulated the
problem of the remedial obsession with integration: "Often there
is a tendency almost like a hydraulic pressure to expand a doctrine
beyond the limits of its logic." 16 4 The admirable goal of integration can consume the ability to build housing where there is
genuine need, which sometimes may mean, in the Shannon court's
165
language, "the rebuilding of a racial ghetto."
Despite remarkably similar facts, the court in King v. Harris166
1-8 See id. at 871.
159
16 See id.

o Id. at 874 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,

416 (1971)).

161 Id. at 873.
162 Id. at 874.

163 Id. at 873, 874.
164 Id. at 878.
165 Shannon v. United States Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809, 822
(3d Cir. 1970); see also supra note 142.
The result in University City can also be understood in light of the court's belief
that the motivation for bringing the suit was not necessarily the advancement of the
nonwhite interests that the regulations ostensibly aim to protect:
The plaintiffs are responsible business persons who have no animosity
against the poor or minorities, and probably would like for all citizens to
have decent housing. But, under the guise of their concern about the poor
and minorities, business interests would probably acquire this land, and the
poor and minorities might be forced to live in areas far more racially
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enforced the regulations in order to advance the goal of integration,
blocking a proposed ninety-six unit project in Staten Island, New
York. 167 HUD's approval of the relatively small project was based
on a determination that the census tract containing the site was only
12.8% nonwhite. The court, however, found that HUD had failed
adequately to account for several nearby housing projects as well as
a concentrated nonwhite population in the general neighborhood,
and had confined its analysis "in vacuo" solely to "imaginary census
tracts." 168
Alarmed by this, the court predicted that merely
introducing these ninety-six apartments would "create an intolerable
situation" and "insure the ghettoization of the area," 169 and it
consequently issued an injunction.
The King court relied in part on the Second Circuit's decision
in Karlen v. Harris,170 which enjoined the construction of a lowincome housing project in an area containing a high concentration
of low-income housing.1 7 1 The Second Circuit "rejected New
York City's low-income housing shortage as a justification for
1 72
continued concentration of low-income housing in one area."
The Supreme Court reversed Karlen in a per curiam opinion that
called for judicial deference to HUD. 173 The opinion stated that
a court "cannot 'interject itself within the area of discretion of the
executive.'"174 Justice Marshall dissented, stating that "[t]he issue
raised... is far more difficult than the per curiam opinion suggests ....
It is apparent to me that this is not the type of case for
a summary disposition." 175 Justice Marshall's call for more

concentrated and poverty-stricken than the proposed housing project ....
University City, 660 F.2d at 878.
166 464 F. Supp. 827 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nom., King v. Faymor Dev. Co., 614 F.2d
1288 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated, 446 U.S. 905, affd on remand, 636 F.2d 1202 (2d Cir.
1980).
167 See id.; Farrell, supra note 139, at 567 (stating that King is an "example of
judicial preference for integration over housing").
168 See King, 464 F. Supp. at 832-36, 839.
169 Id. at 835.

170 590 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'dsubnom., Stryker's Bay Neighborhood Council
v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980) (per curiam).
171 The proposed project was a 17-story high-rise for families to be built on
Manhattan's Upper West Side in an area acknowledged as "an already concentrated
group
1 2 of low-income buildings." Id. at 44.
King, 464 F. Supp. at 843 (relating the Second Circuit's reasoning in Karlen).
173 See Stryker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980) (per
curiam).
174 See id. at 227 (quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976)).
175 Id. at 228, 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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searching review might have resolved the circuits' vacillation in
176
addressing the regulations.
Two other cases, Aertsen v. Landrieu17 7 and Haakmat v.
Pierce178 similarly dealt with proposed sites that appeared to
violate the regulatory prohibitions, but as in University City, the
courts preferred providing housing to integration. Both courts
found that the proposed sites were in areas of "minority concentration" but achieved the desired result through a broad reading of the
exception clause, which effectively nullified the rule.
In Aertsen, the First Circuit found that the prong prohibiting an
"undue concentration of assisted persons" was not violated despite
evidence showing that nearly 40% of the area's population was
assisted persons. 179 Moreover the "area of minority concentration" prong was not satisfied as the parties agreed that the proposed
site was in such an area.1 80 To avoid enjoining construction, the
court read the exception clause to this prong expansively. It found
that the 511 non-minority-area-units that were funded, but not yet in
existence, satisfied the exception that a proposed project could be
built if "sufficient comparable opportunities exist for minority
18 1
families.., outside areas of minority concentration."
The proposed project in Haakmat clearly violated the regulation's "assisted persons" and "minority concentration" prongs. The
area in Staten Island was 71% minority (the school was 92.7%
minority) and would have had 32% of the population receiving
housing subsidies with the new project. At the time the case was
brought, HUD's internal guidelines set 65% minority as constituting
an "area of minority concentration" and 30% assisted as constituting
an "undue concentration of assisted persons." 18 2 The court found
that "[t]here is no doubt that HUD failed to follow its usual
176 The Seventh Circuit decided Alschuler v. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, 686 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1982), almost solely on the basis of deferring to

HUD's expertise in light of Karlen, especially "[gliven the slippery definition of 'the
relevant area,' which turns on numerous objective and subjective factors." Id. at 485.
But see La Plaza Defense League v. Kemp, 742 F. Supp. 792 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (reversing
HUD's approval of a site by finding an undue concentration of assisted persons and
enjoining the project from being built in "People's Park").
177 637 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1980).
178 No. CV-82-1614 (E.D.N.Y. July 12, 1982) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist File).

179 See Aertsen, 637 F.2d at 23.
180 See id.at 24.
181 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 24 C.F.R. § 880.206(c)(1)(i) (1991)).
182 See Haakrmat,No. CV-82-1614, at *10-*11.
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procedures in approving the development." l8 3 Yet the court took
notice of the critical need for housing and the lack of prospective
supply. 184 It determined that the regulation's exception clause
could be invoked: there was "'an overriding need for housing which
cannot be met elsewhere on Staten Island because of a lack of other
185
feasible sites and proposals."''
It is thus clear that these courts have read the exception clauses
so broadly as effectively to alter the rule. Such a reading is
consistent with a recognition of nonwhite community and represents a break from thejudiciary's traditional binary view of violation
and remedy in this area as discrimination opposed by integration.
In sum, the courts' expansive interpretation of the exception
clause to HUD's site selection regulations has put a new spin on
subsidized housing jurisprudence. In permitting some subsidized
housing to be built in nonwhite areas, the courts are recognizing
that the choice to remain in nonwhite community is a legitimate
one. This is a great stride towards achieving a more sensitive
administration of the anti-discrimination goal of the FHA by
incorporating a crucial degree of freedom into the right to choose
where one lives. Certainly, were new construction relegated
exclusively to nonwhite areas, we would be continuing a "separate
and unequal" housing pattern. But the structural deprecation of
nonwhite community entailed by a remedial mandate committed
solely to forced dispersal is an equally antiquated vision.
CONCLUSION

This Comment has shown that the exclusive focus on integration
as the antidote to past and present discrimination in subsidized
housing stigmatizes nonwhites and can operate to deprive them of
needed housing. Through its implied view of valid community as
white-over-black, integration of site distribution (whether on a small
or broad geographical scale) imposes an anglocentric perspective of
society and solidifies an already-entrenched racial hierarchy.
Allowing subsidized housing to languish primarily in segregated
183 Id. at *4.
184 See id. at *5 ("If this development is stopped at this point, or even if it is
slowed down for a few weeks, 140 new units of housing for the poor will not be built
in Staten Island or any place within the city.... There is now, and for the next few
years will be, no private or public money available to create new housing for the
poor.").
185 Id. at *11.
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neighborhoods would seem to be a surrender of remedial efforts in
the face of the herculean task of eradicating racism in housing. But
race-conscious efforts at creating or maintaining integration within
or around subsidized housing, such as ceiling quotas, inflict far too
much stigma to be acceptable vehicles.
These concerns are
especially cogent given the always-already-subordinated position in
which housing beneficiaries find themselves. Further deprecation
of recipients' societal worth through theoretically defective
administrative methods only exacerbates obstacles to mobility.
Respect for choice of location must be paramount in any authentic
remedial scheme.

